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STATEMENT OF tTPEISPICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal properly lies with the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (1953
as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
a.

Issue I: Did the court err in awarding the

Respondent custody of the parties1 children where the court
concluded that "it is clearly in the best interests of the
children to be awarded to Ann Thomas", but for the findings
regarding moral fitness and the character of a noncohabitant third party?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The decision of the Court is

subject to "an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice"
standard.

Maughn v. Maughnr 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App.

1989) . This standard is referred to as "clearly erroneous"

standard. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App.
1989), and Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984).
b.

Issue II:

Did the Court err in limiting the

Petitioner's alimony award to thirty-six (36) months
without any supporting findings?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The decision of the Court is

subject to "an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice"
standard.
1989) .

Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App.

This standard is referred to as "clearly erroneous"

standard. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App.
1989), and Tucker v. Tuckerf 881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984).
"However, to insure the court acted within its broad
discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's decision
must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and
conclusions."

Sukin v. Sukinr 842 P. 2d at 923 - 24 (quoting

Painter v. Painterf 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988)).
c.

Issue III;

Did the court err in failing to find

that the family home was a marital asset in its entirety?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The decision of the Court is

subject to "an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice"
standard.
1989) .

Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App.

This standard is referred to as "clearly erroneous"

standard. Riche v. Richef 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App.
1989), and Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984).
"However, to insure the court acted within its broad
discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's decision
2

must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and
conclusions."

Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P. 2d at 923 - 24 (quoting

Pointer y, Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988)).
d.

Issue IV: Should the court have included in the

martial estate Bert Thomas Construction Company, including
cash on hand which was depleted during the pendency of the
case in part to pay court ordered support obligations?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The decision of the Court is

subject to "an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice"
standard.

Maughn v, Maughn, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App.

1989) . This standard is referred to as "clearly erroneous"
standard. Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App.
1989), and Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984).
"However, to insure the court acted within its broad
discretion, the facts and reasons for the court's decision
must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and
conclusions."

Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P. 2d at 923 - 24 (quoting

Painter V, Painter, 752 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988)).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES &NP RULES.
A. Statutes:
i.

§78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

ii. Utah Code Ann, §30—3—10(1) (1953 as amended).
iii.

Rule 4-903 of the Code of Judicial

Administration
iv.

Rule 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

B

B.

Case Law:
i.

Berger v. Bercrer. 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985);

ii.

Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App.

1989) .
iii.

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-1223

(Utah 1980).
iv.

Fontenot v. Fontenot, 714 PI.2d 1131, 1132-33

(Utah 1986);
v.
App.

Jeffries v. Jeffries, 895 P.2d 835 at 838 (Utah

1995).
vi.

Kallas v. Kallasr 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah 1980);

vii.

Lynn v. Lynnf 165 N.J. Super. 328 (N.J. App.

Div. 1979).
viii.

Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah App.

1989).
ix.

Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah App.

1990).
x.

Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988).

xi.
xii.

Nielsen v. Nielsen, 620 P.2d 511, 514 (Utah 1980)
Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App.

1987) ;
xiii.

Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App.

1989) .
xiv. Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1992).
xv.

Sanderson v. Tryon. 739 P.2d 623 (Utah 1987).
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xvi.

Shepherd v. Shepherd, 816 P.2d 249 (Utah App.

1994) .
xvii.

shioii v. Shioii, 671 P.d 135, 138 (Utah 1983);

xviii,

Stuber v. Stuber. 121 Utah 632, 637, 244, P.2d

650, 652 (1952).
xix.

Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App.

1991).
xx,

Tucker v. Tucker, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah App. 1984).

xxi.

Tucker v. Tucker, II. 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996).

xxii.

Weiss v. Weiss, 226 N.J. Super. (N.J. App. Div.

1988) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF ^>HE CASE.
This divorce case was tried before Judge Lynn W. Davis

between December 5 _ s, 1995 and February 26, 1995. Judge Davis'
decision was rendered by Memorandum on August 19, 1996.

The

parties were married eight days short of their 15th anniversary.
During the pend$nCy D f the action, Ann Thomas enjoyed custody of
the two children subject to a liberal and nearly equal time
sharing visitation agreement. Custody evaluations were performed
by Dr. Elizabeth, B. Stewart and Dr. Jay P. Jensen. At trial Dr.
jTensen testified that

his

recamoex>datd ox> was for

the parties

to

divide the physicai time with the children equally. Dr. Stewart
recommended that the Ann Thomas be awarded sole custody. The
court found:
"The reason this case is so troubling is
because of Pedro Sauer and his negative

t>

influence on the family• Absent his entry,
and his influence, it is clearly in the best
interests of the children to be awarded to
Ann Thomas."
Findings of Fact, f79.
Ann Thomas and Pedro Sauer developed a romantic
relationship either just prior to separation or after separation.
The court found that Mr. Sauer was a "convicted criminal", "suave"
and "debonair."

In determining that Mr. Thomas should be awarded

custody of the children, the court considered the best interests
of the children as "an important factor, but will also consider
the past conduct and moral standards of the parties"

Findings of

Fact, f57.
Mr. Thomas owned a home 35% completed and under
construction at the time of the marriage.

The court concluded

that the value of the home was $150,000.00 at the time of the
marriage based upon the opinion of appraiser Jud Harwood.

Mr.

Harwood's opinion as to the value at marriage was
based upon a data base, notes and an interview which were not
available in his report or at trial.
Mr. Thomas owns Bert Thomas Construction Company.
the sole owner of the company.

He is

It maintained a savings account

throughout the marriage which averaged a balance of approximately
$37,000.00.

As money was required for the family from time to

time funds would be disbursed to Mr. Thomas as income.

That

account was substantially depleted during the pendency of the
case coincident with Mr. Thomas' self reported reduction in

6

income.

The money was used, among other things, for the payment

of court ordered support payments.
Ann Thomas was awarded $700.00 per month alimony for a
period of thirty-six (36) months to begin with the commencement
of the temporary order.

The effect of this order was to

terminate alimony prior to the entry of the Decree.
This appeal addresses the following issues:
1.

The legal standard applied by the court in

determining custody and the weight to be given moral conduct.
2.

Whether the court articulated or had any basis to

limit the duration of alimony.
3.

Whether the court should have considered the family

home as a marital asset and commingled any premarital portion
thereof.
4.

Whether the court should have considered the Bert

Thomas Construction Company and its savings account as a
dissipated marital asset.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.
Following the conclusion of trial in February, 1996 oral

argument was heard on April 1, 1996.
decision on August 19, 1996.

The court rendered its

The ruling did not deal with all of

the issues presented at trial.

The ruling did not specify Mrs.

Thomas' visitation rights or the amount and duration of alimony.
These matters were heard subsequently by motion and two
additional rulings were made which have been incorporated in the
final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Decree of
?

Divorce which were entered on July 9, 1997. Ann Thomas filed her
Notice of Appeal on August 5, 1997.
C.

DISPOSITION OF TRIAL.
The trial court entered its Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce on July 9, 1997.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were married July 17, 1983.

2.

The parties have had two children born of the marriage

as follows: Joseph, born July 12, 1986 and Katy, born July 8,
1989.
3.

The parties separated on March 21, 1983.

4.

Mrs. Thomas is a schoolteacher, aged forty (40) years

old, with a B.S. degree from the University of Utah. She teaches
in the Alpine School District in the same school the children
attend. (Findings of Fact, ff5 - 7.)
5.

Mr. Thomas is a self—employed building contractor, a

high school graduate, who lives in the Sundance, Utah County
area, and concentrates his business in that community. (Findings
of Fact, fl8 and 9.)
6.

The trial court considered the "best interests of the

child" as an important factor but also considered the past
conduct and moral standards of the parties and which parent will
act in the best interests, and the other relevant factors such as
keeping the siblings together and each child's bond with the
parent. (Findings of Fact, f57.)
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7.

The court adopted Dr. Stewart's finding of a strong

sibling bond and found that it was in the best interests of the
children not to be separated. (Findings of Fact, f58.)
8.

Ann Thomas was the primary caretaker for the children

prior to the parties' separation and has performed well as the
mother of the children before separation and since. (Findings of
Fact, f62—63.)
9.

Mr. Thomas acknowledged that Ann Thomas is a

competent, caring mother who has indeed been the primary care
giver for the children throughout their lives. (Findings of Fact,
164.)
10.

As the primary care giver, Mrs. Thomas has seen to the

day to day needs of the children, typically been the parent who
has been home when they return home, assisted the children with
their school work, made sure the children received the
appropriate medical and dental care, typically transported the
children when such was necessary, entertained the children,
disciplined the children and so forth.

Mr. Thomas was also

involved in these activities. (Findings of Fact, f65.)
11.

The children interact with Mrs. Thomas as their

primary care provider and have established confidence in her as
the primary care provider. (Findings of Fact, 566.)
12.

The court interviewed Joseph and Katie in the course

of the proceedings. (Finding of Fact, f52.)
13.

The children's social needs have principally been met

through their school association. (Findings of Fact, f69.)
9

14.

It is unclear when Ann Thomas and Mr. Pedro Sauer

entered into a sexually intimate relationship, whether prior to
separation or since that time. (Findings of Fact, f73(e).)
15.

The relationship between Mrs. Thomas and Mr. Sauer

has continued for several years and it is their intention to
marry when they are legally able.

Mr. Sauer was still married at

the time of trial. (Findings of Fact, 174.)
16.

Custody evaluations were performed by Dr. Jay P.

Jensen and Dr. Elizabeth B. Stewart.

Both experts provided

written evaluations.
17.

Dr. Jensen favored a joint physical custody award with

the children residing with one parent for one week and the other
parent the next with no intervening visitation for either party.
(Trial Transcript, Volume III, page 113, Lines 4 - 2 5.)
18.

Dr. Stewart recommended that Ann Thomas be awarded

sole custody. (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 106, lines 2 13.)
19.

Dr. Jensen relied upon information related to him from

Mr. Thomas who, reportedly, gathered information from Pedro
Sauer's wife and Mrs. Thomas. (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page
45, lines 13 — 25, and page 46, lines 1 — 13.)
20.

Dr. Jensen did not contact collateral sources provided

by the parties because Mrs. Thomas had provided more collateral
sources than Mr. Thomas and he wanted to keep the evaluation as
"bilateral as possible." (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 47,
lines 17 — 25, and page 48, lines 1 — 13.)
10

21.

Dr. Jensen reported "through the evaluation process it

became clear that information regarding Ann's boyfriend was a
central concern to the best interests of the children." (Trial
Transcript, Volume I, page 48, lines 9- 12)
22.

Dr. Jensen found "there are no apparent deficits of

natural ability of either parent to provide for the children's
physical, emotional and spiritual needs." (Trial Transcript,
Volume I, page 53, lines 10 - 15).
23.

Mr. Thomas 1 report regarding Pedro Sauer affected Dr.

Jensen's perception of Mrs. Thomas and her ability to provide for
the children.

(Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 62, lines 8 -

19).
24.

Dr. Jensen was not able to observe any negative impact

presently on the children by virtue of Mr. Sauer.

(Trial

Transcript, Volume I, page 63, lines 2 - 17.)
25.

Dr. Jensen testified that he did not believe Pedro

Sauer played a central role in the formation of his opinion about
the children's best interests.

Rather, Mr. Sauer represented a

potential and present "source of instability" to the children.
(Trial Transcript, Volume I, Page 77, lines 1 8 - 2 5 , page 78,
lines 1 -19.)
26.

Dr. Jensen determined that it was not necessary to

speak to Mr. Sauer and did not, in fact, speak with Mr. Sauer.
(Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 80, lines 15 - 25 and page 8,
lines

1-7.)
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27.

Dr. Stewart interviewed the parties and Pedro Sauer.

(Trial Transcript, page 92, lines 1 5 - 2 5 , and page 93, lines 16.)
28.

Dr. Stewart considered two principal questions: (1)

whether or not Mrs. Thomas had an appreciation for the children's
relationship with Mr. Thomas; and (2) Mr. Sauer's impact on Ann's
parenting ability and whether or not that affects her ability to
have custody.

(Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 94, lines 4 -

11.)
29.

Dr. Stewart concluded that the Thomas marriage was in

trouble for some time before Ann Thomas met Pedro Sauer and did
not believe that Mr. Sauer was responsible for the divorce.
(Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 95, lines 20 - 25; page 96,
lines 1 - 2 5 ; and page 97, lines 1 - 20.)
30.

Based upon Dr. Stewart's evaluation of Mr. Sauer, Dr.

Stewart concluded that Mr. Sauer was aware of Mr. Thomas'
position, was sympathetic to that position and was not
aggravating the relationship between Mr. and Mrs. Thomas and was
sensitive to the children's individual differences and how they
related to their father, as well as being generally supportive of
Mrs. Thomas. (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 100, lines 11 25, and page 101, lines 1 - 12.)
31.

Dr. Stewart did not observe any negative impact on

the children by virtue of the relationship between Ann Thomas and
Pedro Sauer. (Trial Transcript, page 101, lines 13—17.)
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32.

Dr. Stewart found agreement with Dr. Jensen's report

as to Mrs. Thomas being an exceptional caretaker and that Mrs.
Thomas was a very good father. (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page
104, lines
33.

1-9.)
Dr. Stewart concluded that she saw no evidence that

the relationship between Mrs. Thomas and Pedro Sauer had a
negative impact on her parenting skills. (Trial Transcript,
Volume I, page 105, lines 8 - 25.)
105, lines 8 — 25.)
34.

Dr. Stewart did not recommend joint legal or physical

custody because the parties were unable to cooperatively work
with one another. Joint physical custody would be too stressful
on the children, and the children regarded their mother's
residence as "home". (Trial Transcript, Volume I, page 106, lines
14 - 25; page 107, lines 1 — 5 , page 108, lines 1 — 2 3 . )
35.

Dr. Stewart did not find that the children were aware

of any confrontation between Pedro Sauer and Mrs. Sauer at Ann
Thomas' home. (Trial Transcript, Volume II, page 17, lines 5 25, and page 18, lines 1 - 3 .
36.

Dr. Stewart agreed with Dr. Jensen's finding that Mr.

Thomas was susceptible to "emotional overspill" because of his
feelings about the relationship between Mrs. Thomas and Mr.
Sauer. (Trial Transcript, Volume II, page 20, lines
37.

1-9.)

Dr. Stewart could find no objective evidence that the

Ann Thomas / Pedro Sauer relationship negatively impacted the

13

children.

On the contrary Dr. Stewart found that Mr. Sauer's

presence had a soothing effect and the children expressed a good
relationship with Mr. Sauer. (Trial Transcript, Volume II, page
24, lines 13 - 25; page 25, lines 1 — 2 5 , page 26, lines 1 —
17.)
38.

The court conducted its own examination of Dr.

Stewart and inquired, specifically, about "Brazilian culture",
"machismo", and "how an individual with a Brazilian culture might
approach a relationship such as this, at least at the initial
stages." (Trial Transcript, Volume II, page 43, lines 10 - 14.)
38.

The Court concluded that Mr. Sauer was, at the time

of trial: (1) a married man; (2) not a citizen of the United
States: (3) Brazilian in the United States on a work permit; (4)
a martial arts instructor; (5) fathered a child with his wife
while attempting to reconcile with her; (6) had been charged with
domestic violence; (7) was charged with a possession of a firearm
while at Lake Powell and "may have also violated his work permit
status in the United States;" (8) participated in other
adulterous affairs; (9) was presently going through his own
divorce; (10) made Mrs. Sauer's United States residency status
unknown; (11) had a dramatic affect on the breakup of the Thomas
family; and (12) Mrs. Thomas viewed him as a very positive male
role model. (Findings of Fact, f72 and 73.)
39.

Pedro Sauer owns and operates his own martial arts

studio teaching Brazilian Jiu Jitsu and is an instructor for the
United States Navy SEAL Team. (Trial Transcript, Volume IV, page
14

8, lines 10 — 25; page 9, lines 1 - 6 . )
40.

Mr. Sauer entered a "plea in abeyance" as to a charge

of possessing an unregistered gun or some similar charge. There
was no conviction. (Trial Transcript, Volume IV, page 16, lines 9
— 25; page 17, lines 1 — 2 5 ; page 18, lines 1 - 2 5 ; page 19,
lines 1 - 25; and, page 20, lines 1 - 5 . )
41.

Mr. Thomas called Martina Sauer as a witness who

stated emphatically that Mr. Sauer has not been violent with her.
(Trial Transcript, Volume IV, page 129, lines 2 -10.)
42.

The court found that Mr. Sauer was irresponsible, had

impacted the Thomas family because he did not contribute
financially to it and had a confrontation between himself and his
spouse at the Thomas home. (Findings of Fact, 578.)
43.

Nevertheless, the court concluded, significantly:
"Absent his [Pedro Sauer's] entry and his
influence, it is clearly in the best
interests of the children to be awarded to
Ann Thomas. With Pedro in the picture,
which he is and intends to be, it is not
in the best interests of the children to
be in the home and subjected to the
negative influence and example of Pedro."
(Emphasis added) Findings of Fact, 179.

44.

The court found that Mr. Thomas' income was $69,567

per year which was the average income from 1988 to 1992, prior to
separation. (Finding of Fact, fl06.)
45.

Mr. Thomas' income inexplicably, according to his own

testimony, declined sharply since separation. (Finding of Fact,
1104.)
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46.

Mrs. Thomas earned $25,824 per month as a school

teacher and she was ordered to pay $334.61 per month based upon a
sole custody worksheet (in spite of the fact that the ultimate
custody/visitation award constitutes a joint physical custody
relationship). (Finding of Fact, fll3.)
47.

The court found that Ann Thomas should be awarded

$700.00 per month as alimony and properly considered all of the
elements to arrive at that amount. (Finding of Fact, fl24 —
127.)
48.

However, the court limited the alimony award to

thirty-six (36) months and provided for a credit for the amounts
paid pursuant to the temporary order. (Finding of Fact, fl27.) No
findings were made which would indicate the basis for the thirty
six (36) month limitation on alimony.
49.

At the time of the divorce, the parties' family home

was worth $355,000.00. (Finding of Fact, f44.)
50.

At the time of the parties' marriage, Mr. Thomas had

owned the building lot and had begun construction on the family
home and it was 35% completed. (Trial Transcript, Volume III,
page 44, lines 25; page 45, lines 1 — 2 5 . )
51.

Mr. Harwood testified that the value of the home at

the time of the marriage was $150,000.00. (Trial
Transcript, Volume III, page 20, lines 22.)
52

However, Mr. Harwood relied upon a "data bank" and

comparable sales, or a "market approach" that were not reflected
in his report and not available at the time of trial on cross
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examination. (Trial Transcript, Volume III, page 44, lines 1 24; page 47, lines 4 — 7 ; and page 49, lines 11 - 14; page 51,
lines 3 — 4 , and Exhibit 31.)
53.

The parties cohabited prior to their marriage and

from the period of cohabitation forward Mrs. Thomas contributed
to the construction of the home through her own manual labor, the
acquisition of building materials, and building of retaining
walls and generally assisting the Defendant who acted as the
general contractor for the building of the home. The court
characterized these efforts as "modest" on the part of Mrs.
Thomas. (Finding of Fact, f36.)
54.

The Respondent acknowledges that Mrs. Thomas assisted

in building the retaining walls, getting the materials for the
home, and with the interior decoration of the home. (Trial
Transcript, dated February 26, 1996, page 127, lines 8 - 23.)
55.

The court values Mr. Thomas' "pre—marital" interest in

the home at $150,000.00, apparently adopting Mr. Harwood's
opinion based upon the data base which was not available at
trial. (Finding of Fact, f40 and 50.)
56.

Shortly after the marriage of the parties they

borrowed $27,000.00 which has been paid during the marriage and
had a principal balance of $17,500.00. (Trial Transcript, Volume
IV, page 83, lines 24 - 25; page 84, lines 1 - 3 . ) The loan was
from Mrs. Thomas' father.
57.

The title to the home was conveyed to the parties as

joint tenants. (Finding of Fact, f34.)
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58.

Mr. Thomas owns Bert Thomas Construction, Inc.

59.

Mr. Thomas maintained a savings account in Bert

Thomas Construction as well as an operating checking account. His
money was required to pay company expenses or provide income for
Mr. Thomas. Funds were transferred from the savings account to
the checking account. (Trial Transcript, Volume II, pages 97 102)
60.

The average account balance for the combined savings

and checking account prior to separation was $39,000.00

The

average balance in the account after separation was reduced to
$6,327.62. (See Plaintiff's Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, and
Trial Transcript, Volume II, pages 99 — 104).
61.

Mr. Thomas has acknowledged utilizing the Bert Thomas

Construction Company funds in order to pay his court ordered
support obligation under the temporary order.

(Trial Transcript,

dated February 26, 1996, page 122, lines 8 - 19.)
62.

Mr. Thomas testified as to the value of the assets of

Bert Thomas Construction Company.

The court concluded that there

was insufficient evidence to sustain a finding as to the value of
the construction company.
63.

In addition to the testimony of Derk Rasmussen, CPA,

regarding the historical cash assets of the Construction Company,
Mr. Thomas testified by way of his Exhibit 63 that the value of
the company's "tools" amounted to $7,634.00.

(Exhibit 63,

amended by the Respondent at trial to include Items 113 and 114).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

WHERE THE COURT RULED THAT "IT IS CLEARLY IN THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN TO BE AWARDED TO ANN THOMAS" IT IS
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS TO IGNORE THAT FINDING AND AWARD THE
CHILDREN TO THE RESPONDENT BASED SOLELY ON FINDINGS OR
MORAL FITNESS AND THE CHARACTER OF A NON-COHABITING THIRD
PARTY,
The court correctly concluded that the children's best

interests would be served by an award of custody to Mrs. Thomas.
However, the court ignored that finding and awarded Mr. Thomas
custody.

The sole or controlling reasons for the award of

custody to Mr. Thomas were: (1) Mrs. Thomas1 past moral conduct;
and (2) the character of Pedro Sauer, a romantic acquaintance of
the Petitioner.

In so doing the court placed too much weight

upon those factors.

This is not a "close call" case.

Rather, it

is a case where the best interests of the children were otherwise
"clear".
The court's conclusions regarding Pedro Sauer appear to be
based upon some other experience with Brazilian men and Brazilian
culture.

The court did not make any connection between Mrs.

Thomas' moral conduct or Mr. Sauer's character and the
Petitioner's parenting ability or the best interests of the
children.

In its attempt to make that connection, the court has

simply created a transparent rationale for punishing past moral
transgressions.
II.

ALIMONY SHOULD CONTINUE FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED THE
DURATION OF THE MARRIAGE WHERE NQ FACTS APPEAR WHICH WOULD
JUSTIFY TERMINATION AFTER THREE YEARS. INCLUDING PAYMENTS
UNDER THE TEMPORARY ORDER.
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The Petitioner does not object to the amount of alimony
only its duration.

The court limited alimony to thirty-six (36)

months and provided the Respondent credit for payments made
during the pendency of the case.

However, there are no findings

to indicate that circumstances will change at the end of thirtysix months.

In fact, alimony terminated prior to the entry of

the decree.

The court should extend alimony for a period of time

not to exceed the length of the marriage.
III. THE MARITAL HOME IS A COMMINGLED ASSET AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN

EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTED TO THE PARTIES,

FURTHERMORE, THERE

IS NOT RELIABLE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE COURT'S FINDING OF A
PREMARITAL FAIR MARKET VALUE.
The martial home was substantially constructed during the
marriage.

The lot was owned by the Respondent prior to the

marriage and the home construction begun prior to that time.
However, Mrs. Thomas has enhanced, maintained and protected the
home.

The marital home is a peculiar asset when compared with

other, traditionally "separate" assets.

It is particularly

susceptible to "commingling" and was commingled in this case.
This court may clarify previous decisions which may be
contradictory or confusing regarding the commingling of
premarital property.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD HAVE VALUED AND DISTRIBUTED BERT THOMAS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY INCLUDING THE HISTORICAL BALANCE IN
THE LIQUID ACCOUNTS WHICH WERE DISSIPATED BY THE
RESPONDENT.
The court failed to make findings or to equitably

distribute the value of Bert Thomas Construction Company.
only is the company possessed of "hard" assets including
20

Not

equipment and cash, the cash on hand was dissipated during the
pendency of the divorce during an "inexplicable" reduction in Mr.
Thomas1 income.
marital property.

The company was susceptible to valuation and is
The use of the liquid assets by Mr. Thomas

constitutes dissipation.
PETAIfc OF ARCHJMEWT
POINT

I.

WHERE THE COURT RULED THAT "IT IS CLEARLY
IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN TO BE
AWARDED TO ANN THOMAS" IT IS CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS TO IGNORE THAT FINDING AND AWARD
THE CHILDREN TO THE RESPONDENT BASED
SOLELY ON FINDINGS OR MORAL FITNESS AND
THE CHARACTER OF A NON-COHABITANT THIRD
PARTY,
The Appellant challenges the custody ruling of the trial
court for the following reasons:
1.

The court applied an incorrect legal standard for the

determination of custody. The best interests of the children
should have been given paramount and controlling consideration.
Instead the court placed too much weight upon "past conduct and
moral standards of the parties".
2.

The court failed to adequately articulate how Pedro

Sauer's character deficiencies negatively affected the best
interests of the children.

The court does not attempt to show

that Mrs. Thomas1 parenting ability is diminished because of the
relationship with Mr. Sauer.
3.

Key factual findings regarding Mr. Sauer's past

behavior are not supported by the evidence.
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Trial courts have broad discretion in custody matters:
"However, while the trial court has broad discretion, it must be
guided at all times by the best interests of the child." Tucker
v. Tucker, II. 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996) referring to Utah Code
Ann. §30—3—10(1) .
One of the factors to be considered is the moral conduct of
the parties. However,
"Utah courts have previously noted that a
custodial parent's censurable extramarital sexual activities do not in and of
themselves make him or her an unfit and
improper person to have custody. Tucker v.
Tucker I, 881 P.2d 948 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). See FontenQt Vt FQntenQt, 714 PI.2d
1131, 1132-33 (Utah 1986); Shioji v.
Shjoji, 671 P.d 135, 138 (Utah 1983);
(Durham, J., concurring and dissenting);
Nielsen v. Nielsen, 620 P.2d 511, 514
(Utah 1980)(Hall, C.J., dissenting);
Kallas V, Kallas, 614 P.2d 641, 645 (Utah
1980); Stuber v. Stuberf 121 Utah 632,
637, 244, P.2d 650, 652 (1952).
In order to avoid the tendency to deny custody to an
unfaithful spouse/parent as a punitive matter, Utah courts have
required trial judges to show: (1) that the parent's activities
run contrary to the child's best interests; and (2) that the
inappropriate moral conduct results in an inability to function
adequately as the custodial parent and meet the child's needs.
Tucker v. Tucker I, Supra, and Erwin v T Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849
(Utah App. 1989).
It is inappropriate for the trial court to base its
decision solely upon a party's sexual conduct.
Merriamr 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1990).
22

Merriam v.

In that case, the

matter was not reversed because the court had considered other
factors relevant to the child's best interest.
court has considered other, relevant factors.

In this case the
However, in this

case, the court determined that based upon the other factors, it
would clearly be in the best interests of the children for Mrs.
Thomas to be awarded their custody.

The decision not to do so is

based entirely upon either Mrs. Thomas' past moral conduct or Mr.
Sauer's character.

If the decision was based upon Mrs. Thomas'

moral conduct, absent some connection to her parenting ability,
the award is an abuse of discretion.

Roberts v. Robertsf 835

P.2d 193 (Cal. 1992), the concept of fault [punishment] is
unrelated to best interests; Sanderson v. Tryonf 739 P.2d 62 3
(Utah 1987) . The court should demonstrate how the past moral
conduct bears upon the parties' parenting abilities or affects
the children's best interests.
The case before the court now is distinguishable from the
case of Tucker v. Tuckerf supra. In that case the Supreme Court
found that it was not a case of parental fitness. Rather, it was
a case of basically egual parenting ability between the parents
where the scales were tipped slightly based upon one parent's
moral fitness.
In this case, the court has determined that the best
interests of the children would "clearly" be served if Ann Thomas
were awarded custody, but for the influence of Pedro Sauer. The
court found Pedro Sauer's influence to be "troubling" for three
reasons: (1) because the affair broke up the Thomas family; (2)
because Ann Thomas considered Pedro Sauer to be a positive role
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model but was in fact "duped by his suave, debonair and romantic
influences;" (3) that it was not in the best interests of the
children to be in the home and subjected to his negative
influence and example.
In so doing, the court expressly and candidly stated that
it would " . . . consider the best interests of the child as an
important factor, but would also consider the past conduct and
moral standards of the parties. . ." (Finding of Fact, f57.)
It is apparently from the court's detailed Findings that
this was not a "close call" case except for the question of
infidelity and the "entry" of Pedro in the Thomas family.
In spite of the fact that Dr. Stewart failed to detect any
negative impact of Mr. Sauer on Mrs. Thomas' parenting ability
for the best interests of the children, the court has based its
custody decision on such a finding. It should be remembered that
Dr. Jensen did not interview Pedro Sauer and could not make any
findings about his character and affirmatively stated that Mr.
Sauer's involvement did not play a central role in determining
the children's best interest.
The court, nevertheless, essentially concluded as follows:
(1) Pedro Sauer is an unsavory character; (2) the court was
"profoundly concerned" over Mrs. Thomas' favorable impression of
Mr. Sauer; and (3) the relationship between Mrs. Thomas and Pedro
Sauer had a dramatic affect on the breakup of the Thomas family.
As a result, custody should be awarded to Mr. Thomas.

As a

result the court concluded that Mr. Thomas should be awarded
custody in spite of the fact that the other custody factors
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clearly indicated that the children's best interests would be
served if Mrs. Thomas was awarded custody.
This rationale is flawed and an abuse of discretion
because: (1) Mr. Sauer's character has not been shown to be
relevant to the children's best interests or Mrs. Thomas'
parenting ability; (2) some of the findings are not supported by
the fact (those that related to domestic violence and being a
convicted criminal); and, (3) the discussion regarding the break
up of the Thomas family is a roundabout way of punishing Mrs.
Thomas for marital infidelity.
Aside from the hearsay evidence of Mr. Thomas, upon which
Dr. Jensen relied, the only evidence regarding Pedro Sauer's
criminal behavior is his own testimony where he testified that he
entered a "plea in abeyance" in regards to the gun charge.
Pedro Sauerfs wife was called to testify by Mr. Thomas.
Her testimony was that there has been no domestic violence in the
Sauer marriage.

The only other evidence to support a finding of

"domestic violence" would be the charge of Mrs. Sauer, previous,
that such violence had occurred.

The charge was never proven, no

ruling was ever made upon any criminal or civil case of domestic
or cohabitant abuse regarding Mr. Sauer.
Beyond those findings, the trial court referred to factors
regarding Mr. Sauer's citizenship, his own pending divorce and
the fact that he had fathered a child with his wife while
separated from her as a basis for denying Ann Thomas custody of
her children (and disrupting the status quo custody order).
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The

court also found that Mr. Sauer was "suave", "debonair", and had
"duped" Mrs, Thomas with his "romantic influence".1
All in all the court concluded that it could not conceive
how Pedro would be a positive role model for "little Joseph".
Such findings about Mr. Sauerfs personality are difficult to
quantify or define.

More important, however, is the difficulty

in relating those findings to Ann Thomas1 parenting ability or
the best interests of the children.

If this standard were

applied to other cases, then it would be difficult for any parent
to be awarded custody where it was shown that they were involved
in a romantic relationship at the time of the breakdown of their
marriage.

There is no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Sauer was

anything worse than a poor "role model".

In fact, as the court

found:
"The evaluators can make no objective1
link between the "affair1 and its impact
on the children. The fact of the matter
is that they are young and may not
appreciate the consequences of a fairly
discreet sexual affair. . ." (Findings of
Fact, f78)
Only when extraordinary circumstances exist should the
court consider the impact of third parties such as step parents.
Rule 4-903 of the Code of Judicial Administration, the Uniform
Custody Evaluations, sets forth the criteria that evaluators must
consider and respond to each of the factors set forth therein.

1

The court demonstrated it's own personal concern
regarding "Brazilian culture" and "machismo" in its own
examination of Dr. Stewart. Those issues had not been raised
anywhere else in the proceedings or at trial. (Trial Transcript,
Volume II, page 43; lines 10 - 14.)
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Section (3)(E)(vii) provides: "The evaluators must consider
and respond to "kinship1, including, in extraordinary
circumstances, step-parent status." There is nothing in this
case to suggest that extraordinary circumstances exist in regards
to the relationship between Mr. Sauer and the Thomas children or
Ann Thomas for that matter.

It is submitted that such

extraordinary circumstances would include, obviously, any form of
abuse between the third party and the subject children, or
behavior that results in some measurable and negative way on the
best interests of the children.

The court has acknowledged in

paragraph 78 of its Findings that no such circumstances exist.
Dr. Stewart specifically found that there was an absence of
any negative impact on the
Thomas children by virtue of the relationship between Mrs. Thomas
and Mr. Sauer. in fact, Mr. Sauer's presence was "soothing" for
the Thomas children.
The initial inquiry should be as to the relevance of the
findings regarding Mr. Sauer's citizenship, occupation, criminal
record (if one exists) or other character attributes. Mr. Sauer
is not even a cohabitant in this controversy. Nobody who
interviewed the children, including the Judge, was able to
identify any negative impact of Mr. Sauer on the children.
The court has attempted to justify the custody award by
finding that Mr. Sauer has not contributed financially to the
Thomas family, that there was a confrontation at the Thomas house
(albeit brief), which was "not positive for the children", that
Mr. Sauer is a convicted criminal and there has been a spouse
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abuse charge, and that Mr. Sauer had a dramatic affect on the
breakup of the Thomas family. None of these findings has anything
to do, except in the most collateral and vague sense, with the
best interests of the children or Mrs. Thomas' parenting ability.
Taken together they do not form the basis of overcoming what the
court also found to be "clearly in the best interests
of the children" which would be an award of custody to Ann
Thomas.
Whether Pedro Sauer is a "suave, debonair", convicted
criminal and spouse abuser, and whether Mrs. Thomas does not
believe any of that, does not form a sufficient factual basis for
the court's custody award. Those allegations, even if taken at
face value, do not overcome the court's ultimate conclusion that
Mrs. Thomas should be awarded custody but for Mr. Sauer's entry
and influence in the equation.
POINT II.
ALIMONY SHOULD CONTINUE FOR A PERIOD NOT
TO EXCEED THE DURATION OF THE MARRIAGE
WHERE NO FACTS APPEAR WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY
TERMINATION AFTER THREE YEARS, INCLUDING
PAYMENTS UNDER THE TEMPORARY ORDER.
The court addressed the issue of alimony in its findings
no. 115 through 127.

In so doing the court properly considered

the needs of Mrs. Thomas, her ability to meet her own needs and
the ability of Mr. Thomas to assist her.

However, the court

inexplicably limited the duration of alimony to three years.
Moreover, the court awarded the Defendant "credit" for amounts
paid pursuant to the temporary order of the court.
Fact fl27.)

(Finding of

The temporary order of the court was entered on the
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11 day of January, 1992. Therefore, alimony terminated before the
Decree was even entered.
Utah courts have found that in the absence of articulated
findings showing some anticipated change in circumstances, or
grounds for "rehabilitative" alimony, the limitation of alimony
to an arbitrary period of time is an abuse of discretion.
Thronscpn Vt ThronSQn, 810 P. 2d 428 (Utah App. 1991) (an otherwise
appropriate award of $800.00 per month alimony, but limited to
one year was made permanent where there were no supporting
findings or rationale for the limitation on duration.)

In this

case there is nothing to suggest that circumstances will change
in any financial sense.

There were certainly no findings to

explain why the court limited alimony to three years or why the
court granted "credit" for the alimony paid during the pendency
of the case.

Normally, decisions regarding the divorce are made

at the time of the decree or trial.

The exception to that

general rule should be based upon clearly stated grounds such as
the obstructive activity of a party, the hiding of assets, or the
dissipation of assets.

Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah

App. 1987); Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); and
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-1223 (Utah 1980).
POINT III.
THE MARITAL HOME IS A COMMINGLEP ASSET ANP
SHOVLP HAVE PEEN EQUITABLY DISTRIBUTEP TO
THE PARTIES, FURTHERMORE, THERE IS NOT
RELIABLE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE COURT'S
FINPING OF A PREMARITAL FAIR MARKET VALUE.
The Appellant does not contest the court's findings
regarding the fair market value of the home at the time of the
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divorce.

Mrs. Thomas1 objections are two fold: (1) the failure

of the court to consider the home as a marital asset and
"commingle" any premarital portion of the Respondent; and (2) the
lack of evidence to support the court's finding of a premarital
value in the home of $150,000.00.
Mr. Thomas owned the building lot upon which the family
home was constructed for several years prior to the marriage.
During this period of time the parties1 cohabited.

Likewise, the

parties worked together on the construction of the home, before
and after marriage.

At the time of the marriage the home was

approximately 35% constructed.
Obviously, 65% of the home was constructed after the
marriage.

In fact, the testimony of Mr. Thomas was that the home

was essentially a work in progress and was still being modified
and constructed at the time of the trial.
The home was pledged for a loan which was paid during the
marriage and had a balance due at the time of the trial.

The

home had been transferred from Mr. Thomas1 name into the joint
names of the parties.
time of the divorce.

Mrs. Thomas had separate assets at the
Her separate assets consisted of stock

which had been gifted to her (with similar gifts going to her
siblings) of stock from her father and grandfather.

These funds

had been maintained entirely separately, in Mrs. Thomas1 name
throughout the marriage.
The rule regarding separate property, and "commingled"
property is set forth in Mortensen v. Mortensenf 760 P.2d 304
(Utah 1988) . The rule is simple: Separate property acquired by a
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spouse prior to the marriage, by gift or inheritance during the
marriage, should be awarded to that party, unless:
"(1) the other spouse has by his or her
effort or expense contributed to the
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of
that property thereby acquiring any
equitably interest in it, or (2) the
property has been consumed or its identify
lost through the commingling or exchanges
or where the acquiring spouse has made a
gift of an interest there and to the other

spouse.

MQrtensen, gupr?t, at 306

(citations omitted).
Cases dealing with separate property which follow Mortensen
had obscured that rule.

See, Utah Bar Journal, Volume XI, No. 3,

The Conundrum of Gifted,

Inherited

Divorce,

and Premarital

Property

in

April, 1998, pages 1 6 - 2 4 , David S. Dolowitz, attached

as Exhibit G in the Addendum.
Some properties are more likely to be commingled due to
"enhancement, maintenance and protection" than others.

Other

factors would indicate that otherwise separate property has been
transformed to marital property such as: the length of time that
the property exists during the marriage, the nature of the
property, real estate occupied by the parties, separate bank
accounts, separate securities, whether the asset requires the
ongoing use of marital funds to pay property taxes, mortgage
expenses, maintenance, remodeling, repairs or the like:
"The longer gifted, inherited or premarital
property is maintained during a marriage
the more difficult it is to show it is a
separate property. . . As discussed above,
the payment of property taxes,
refinancing, maintenance, remodeling,
repair of a home or a rental property
presents the probability of commingling."
The Conundrum . . . " Suprar at page 23.
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The rationale of the court in awarding Mr. Thomas
$150,000.00 as premarital separate property is as follows: (1)
the property was not commingled; and (2) even if it were because
it is clear that Mrs. Thomas should get her separate property it
is only fair for Mr. Thomas to be awarded his.
If Mortensen v. Mortensen, supra, is to have any meaning,
then a case such as this should result in a conclusion that the
family home is a marital asset.
during the marriage.

It was primarily constructed

In addition to the payment of a mortgage,

taxes, remodeling, repair and maintenance, Mrs. Thomas worked
side by side with Mr. Thomas constructing the structure.

To

compare this asset with Mrs. Thomas1 separate assets is a case of
"apples and oranges".

In addition, the basis upon which the

court relied in forming its opinion as to the value of the home
at marriage is flawed.
Jud Harvard.

The court relied upon the evaluation of

That appraisal is called a "complete appraisal -

restricted appraisal".

It purports to state the value of the

property in 1982 and at the time of trial.

The appraisal as to

the 1982 value states that Mr. Harvard relied upon "appraisal
files on other properties that I appraised in the early and mid1980s. . ."

And that Mr. Harvard " . . . researched the market

and comparable sales that were transacted in the Sundance area
during the early and mid-1980s."
Harvard at pages 5 and 6.

Exhibit 3, appraisal of Jud

However, none of the underlying data

regarding the 1982 valuation is set forth in the appraisal, nor
was the data bank or other information relied upon by Mr. Harvard
available at trial.
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Rule 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence require that: "The
expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying
facts or data on cross examination."
do this.

Mr. Harvard was unable to

The Petitioner's appraisal did not opine regarding the

1982 value because of the unreliability of any such opinion.

POINT IVf
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE VALUED AND

DISTRIBUTED PERT THQNAS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY INCLUDING TflE HISTORICAL BALANCE
IN THE LIQUID ACCOUNTS WHICH WERE
DISSIPATED BY THE RESPONDENT.
The court refused to: (1) place a value on Bert Thomas
Construction Company; and (2) find that the use of the savings
account during the pendency of the action by Mr. Thomas
constituted dissipation.

The court did find that the reduction

in Mr. Thomas 1 income was "inexplicable".

The court found that

Mr. Thomas "has been a reasonably successful contractor earning,
typically during the years, just prior to separation,
approximately $70,000.00.)

Furthermore,

"Inexplicably and contrary to the
Defendant's own testimony, the actual Bert
Thomas Construction Company revenue has
declined sharply since separation
regardless of the trend of residential
construction in Utah County and the
previous Bert Thomas construction trend."
See Exhibit 13 (Findings of Fact, fl04).
It is undisputed that Mr. Thomas relied upon the cash on
hand in Bert Thomas Construction Company accounts (savings and
checking) during the pendency of the case.

Furthermore, these

funds were depleted, substantially, because of the "inexplicable"
reduction in Mr. Thomas1 income.
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Derk Rasmussen, CPA, testified

on behalf of the Petition that the Bert Thomas Construction
Account balances reduced from a combined average balance of
approximately $37,000.00 for the four years prior to separation,
to $7,470.00 at the time of the trial.

(Exhibit 9, 10 and 11.)

Mr. Thomas introduced his own testimony regarding any tools
on hand for his construction company with a total combined value
at the time of trial of $7,634.00, see Exhibit 63.
The Petitioner did not seek to attribute any good will to
the value of Bert Thomas Construction Company (or the related
leasing company).

The Petitioner only sought a value for the

"hard assets" which would consist of tools, inventory and cash on
hand.

Evidence was before the court on each of these iteMrs.

It

simply called for adding the amounts together.
The only difficult issue is whether or not Mr. Thomas
dissipated this marital asset.

In that sense it does not matter

whether the parties used Bert Thomas Construction Company money
as a de facto family savings account.

Even if they did not, it

was part of the marital asset.
Utah courts have adopted the doctrine of dissipation of
marital assets.

Where marital assets are used without the

approval or knowledge of the other spouse, in an effort to hide
those assets, or in such a manner as to benefit only one party,
the court may find the dissipation of assets.
Jeffries, 895 P.2d 835 at 838 (Utah App. 1995).

Jeffries v.
See, also,

Shepherd v. Shepherd. 816 P.2d 249 (Utah App. 1994).
Furthermore, other jurisdictions have held that the use of
marital assets for payment of temporary support obligations
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constitutes dissipation.

Lynn v. Lynnr 165 N.J. Super. 328 (N.J.

App. Div. 1979), and Weiss v. Weiss, 226 N.J. Super. (N.J. App.
Div. 1988) .
Mr. Thomas should be required to account for the legitimate
and business use of those funds.

This is especially so in light

of the inexplicable reduction in his income during the pendency
of the case.

If, as the Petitioner alleges, Mr. Thomas

voluntarily reduced his self employment income and relied upon
substantial account balances for his support, as well as the
payment of temporary support obligations, that behavior should
constitute dissipation.
CONCLUSION
The court's custody decision was clearly erroneous where it
ignored its own finding regarding the best interests of the
children.

Similarly, the best interest of the children is a

controlling conclusion not an "important" finding.

Where the

best interest of the children would clearly be served by the
Petitioner being awarded custody, it is clearly erroneous for the
court to conclude contrary to that where the past moral conduct
of the custodial parent does not interfere with her parenting
ability or the best interests of the children.

Likewise, the

character of a non-cohabitant third party was given too much
weight by the trial court and does not bear upon Mrs. Thomas1
parenting ability or the best interests of the children.
The alimony amount is not contested by the Petitioner.
However, the duration of alimony was limited to thirty-six (36)
months without any explanation or finding to support that ruling.
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By providing the Respondent "credit" for payments under the
temporary order, alimony actually terminated before the entry of
the decree.

This conclusion is not supported by the findings and

is clearly erroneous.

The court refused to make a finding

regarding the value of Bert Thomas Construction Company, a
marital asset.

Sufficient facts were introduced to do so,

including evidence regarding the historical balances in liquid
accounts maintained by the company.

These accounts were drawn

down and dissipated by the Respondent during the pendency of the
action.

The value of the company, prior to dissipation, should

have been equitably divided.
The home of the parties was substantially constructed
during the marriage.

It was clearly augmented, maintained and

protected by Mrs. Thomas and should have been included in its
entirety in the marital estate.

If not, the court erred in

concluding that there was a "premarital" separate portion of the
fair market value of $150,000.

This finding is not based upon

reliable and credible evidence.
The court's conclusions regarding custody should be
reversed and the matter remanded for appropriate findings and
decision regarding the Respondent's visitation and parental
rights.

Additionally, on remand the court should equitably

distribute the value of the family home and Bert Thomas
Construction Company.

Lastly, this court should extend the

duration of alimony to a term not to exceed the length of the
marriage.
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day of July, 1998.
GREEN & BERRY

FREDERICK N. GREEN
Attorney for Appellant
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